Another significant #Wirecard day in Munich yesterday, featuring balance sheet explanations from expert economics professor Wilhelm Heuser about 50 formerly affiliated Wirecard AG companies.

The expert report exceeds 2,000 pages. Yesterday, the first 50 companies were analyzed from a balance sheet perspective.

The German economics professor read selected sentences from his #Wirecard expert opinion, showing balance sheet calculations and tables with values like the beta factor and country risk on the court projector.

Many companies examined by the #Wirecard court, with a very specific mandate only(!), were located abroad, with balance sheet periods mostly from 2015 to 2018. Balance sheet and liquidity analyses form only a small part of the reasons for establishing and maintaining these companies, especially overseas.

Strategic business orientations with foreign subsidiaries for long-term and early market presence are neither mentioned by the court nor included in the expert report.

When the #Wirecard expert discussed Prisma Vista, he mentioned a "high country risk" toward the end. When the judge asked where the company was based, the expert searched his documents, then stated: "Uh... I don’t know... I think...India."

After some time, Dr. Braun's defense attorney intervened, asking why the #Wirecard expert only verbally presented selective passages verbatim from his report, available for all to read themselves.

The expert should "not read aloud here, but explain how he arrived at his results for the respective companies" instead of giving an expert opinion.

The expert prepared the report with others' help, Dr. Braun's defense attorney stated further.

The presiding #Wirecard judge intervenes, interrupting the defense attorney as he often did during the trial.

He asks condescendingly into the court microphone whether Dr. Braun's attorney "doesn't realize how absurd your statement is" - neutral observers however find her question quite justified.

The defense attorney states clearly that this question is justified and not about reading the #Wirecard report aloud, as the expert has done, but about explaining his results.

The judge dismisses these questions, after which the expert says he "doesn’t understand the defense attorney’s question either."

He then reads passages from page 550 of the document, outlining his "methodological approach."

The discussion involves more former #Wirecard-affiliated companies. The judge frequently highlights specific exchange rates(!) used by the expert on the court projector.

Eventually, it’s clear why: for an Austrian Wirecard affiliated company, the expert assigns a country risk factor of 0.4, stating, "This is slightly higher for Austria than for Germany(!)," per the expert.

For the #Wirecard companies mentioned, the expert report considers balance sheet periods from 2015 to mostly 2018, with some exceptions including 2019.

Given the significant growth in the eCommerce sector after 2017, this seems incomprehensible and likely stems from court requirements.

When the #Wirecard judge asks if any companies were candidates for insolvency, the expert confirms this without hesitation.

The judge then clarifies that "the question about insolvencies was not part of the expert report’s mandate."

A defense attorney intervenes, asking the expert if he sourced liquidity figures from Jaffe’s insolvency report or calculated the liquidity value himself.

Prof. Heuser, visibly caught off guard, stating, "Yes, although this was not a calculation."

The attorney asks if Heuser considered the #Wirecard parent company's commitment to financial support, providing evidence. He inquires if the expert recalls this.

Prof. Heuser, now stammering and visibly irritated, says into the microphone, "It's not my mandate ... to say an insolvency application had to be filed. This is not the mandate given to me by the court."

A similar situation occurred in discussions about #Wirecard Romania.

The expert states that although the insolvency administrator obtained 77 million euros from the sale of this Wirecard subsidiary, no balance sheets were available after 2015(!).

Dr. Braun's defense attorney asked how the insolvency administrator actually sold the #Wirecard companies.

The expert explained they held a small bidding process with two final candidates, which "increased the price."

For #Wirecard Global Sales GmbH, a sale price of 2.5 million euros was achieved.

For Wirecard Mexico, they "took over CitiBank loans," but these costs were not passed on; these are "the statements of the insolvency administrator," according to Prof. Heuser here.

For the #Wirecard Central Europe subsidiary, "differences in intra-year accounting" emerged, the expert stated.

When the defense asked how he resolved these, Prof. Heuser explained that they "interpolated, i.e., calculated the missing data proportionally over time"(!), to reach a sustainable annual value.