

OFFICE OF U. S. CHIEF OF COUNSEL
FOR THE PROSECUTION OF AXIS CRIMINALITY

INTERROGATION DIVISION SUMMARY

Interrogation of HAUSHOFER, Karl
By: Col. H. A. Brundage, 5 October 1945

PERSONS IMPLICATED, AND SUBJECTS

1. HAUSHOFER
 - a. Relationship with HESS (p.2)
 - b. As President of German Academy from 1934 - 1937 (p.17 - 18, 20 - 21)
 - c. Views on Lebensraum (p. 22 - 23)
2. HESS
 - a. Relationship with Hitler (p. 4)
 - (1) Collaboration in writing Mein Kampf (p.6 -9)

CHARACTERIZATION OF HESS

Professor Doctor Karl Haushofer was a teacher in geopolitics, no member of any Nazi organization. He had a very intimate acquaintanceship with Hess. He was in close contact with him since the time Hess was his student until he flew to England. He describes him as follows: His strong side was not intelligence but heart and character (p. 2 - 3). He had a blind devotion to Hitler, and Hitler discussed with him subjects of philosophy, such as geopolitics. Hess was far more educated in the field of geopolitics than Hitler (p. 4). Haushofer thinks that Hitler got his ideas on the subject "Lebensraum" from Hess, but that Hitler never understood them really (p.5). As far as the witness knows, Hess actually dictated many chapters of the book "Mein Kampf". In the main principles, he states, Hitler's ideas never reflected his teachings (pp. 6 to 9). He thinks that Ribbentrop inspired Hitler more in regard to geopolitics than Hess (p. 10).

In the opinion of the witness, the reason for Hess' flight to England was his own sense of honor and perhaps in connection with initiating peace feelers. However, Hess did not talk with him about this matter (p. 15).

AS PRESIDENT OF GERMAN ACADEMY

The witness explains the difference of his opinions and his teachings contrary to Hitler's and the contents of his book "Mein Kampf" (p.11 to 14).

Karl Haushofer, 5 October 1945

The relations of the witness to Bohle were very unfriendly (p.16). The witness was President of the German Academy and he states that this organization, as long as he was President, from 1934 to 1937, had no part of the propaganda machine (p. 17 - 18) and no connection with the German High Command (p. 20,21).

The witness gives a detailed picture of the activities of the Academy (p. 19 - 20). He does not have exact knowledge of the secret armament (p.21). He also hoped for a peaceful settlement. He thought that there would be enough Lebensraum for the Germans for 100 years if the Nazis would have been satisfied with what was given to them in Munich (p. 22 - 23).



Testimony of KARL HAUSHOFER, taken at
Nurnberg, Germany, 5 October, 1945,
1445 - 1600, by Colonel Howard A.
Brundage, JAGD, OUSCC.
Also present: Dr. Edmund A. Walsh,
Expert Consultant to Justice Jackson;
Siegfried Ramler, Interpreter; and
S/ Sgt. William A. Weigel, Court Reporter.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL BRUNDAGE TO THE INTERPRETER:

Q Will you state your name?

A Siegfried Ramler.

Q By whom are you employed?

A The Office of the U. S. Chief of Counsel.

Q What are your present duties?

A Interpreter.

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will truly and accurately
translate the English into German and the German into English of
all the testimony to be given in this hearing, so help you God?

A I do.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL BRUNDAGE TO THE WITNESS THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give in
this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?

A I do.

Q How are you feeling? All right?

A Yes. I am so interested in this moment, you see, for if
afterwards the old body goes down, it will all go down.

Q Just sit back and relax and we will have a little discussion
on this matter. Now, will you state your full name?

A Professor Doctor Karl Haushofer.

(HAUSHOFER)

Q Where did you live?

A Hartschimmelhof, nr. Paehl, upper Bavaria.

Q I know that you have been interrogated before and the subject of geopolitics has been covered in a general way, but there are a few points that we would like to clarify at this time, so we won't go through the same material that you were questioned about before.

A Yes. I have been interrogated at Freising five days and at Oberursel ten days.

Q In that previous interrogation, you said that you had a very intimate acquaintanceship with Hess?

A Yes.

Q Was he a former student of yours?

A He was a former student of mine, and I knew Hess long before there existed a National Socialist Party. I knew him through an old officer of Ordnance of mine who was a flyer with him, and he told him so much about my old work that he wanted to make my acquaintance; so that my friendship with Hess has been for a long time. It began with a military comradeship with a very good Ordnance officer of mine who was with me three years in the first World War and with him. Afterwards he studied in our university and wanted to achieve a Doctorate. He had Professor Kalker of the People's Reich, and then there was a very clever Democratic professor of Public Law, and Professor Zwiedeneck, and Suedenhorst, and from an old Austrian family. He was of the national economy. On those four faculties he wanted to make his Doctorate.

Q Did you find him to be an attentive student?

A Yes. He was a very attentive student but, you see, his strong side was not intelligence but heart and character, I should say.

(HAUSHOFER)



He was not very intelligent.

Q Did you find that he evidenced great interest in the subject matter that you taught?

A He had great interest and he worked very hard but, you see, at that time in Munich there were all those students and ~~of~~ officers' associations, a very strong political movement, and so the young men were always drawn away from their work.

Q Did you feel that you had a great deal of influence in molding his ideas?

A I had a moral influence on him but there was a competition between the political influences and the scientific influences.

Q But your conclusion is that you did have considerable influence in molding his ideas as to his future conduct?

A Yes. My influence was only good as far as he was under my eyes and I could check up on him. I have to honestly say now that up to the time of his flying away, he was very much devoted to me and he protected me and my family from bad experiences with the Party.

Q Were you able to maintain a close intimate relationship with him during all that time?

A Yes. I tried to point out to him, perhaps, out of twenty things only two that came to my knowledge which I thought were wrong, but otherwise the Party used to tear him away from me.

Q Was he a man that had great persuasive powers on other people?

(HAUSHOFER)

A No. He had no knowledge of human beings and he had often been betrayed by the people surrounding him.

Q Isn't it a fact that there was a great personal affection for him on the part of Hitler?

A He had a blind devotion to Hitler and you can say that the relationship from him to Hitler was one of an obedient relationship.

Q But I meant in the other direction. Wasn't Hitler devoted to Hess because of a personal friendship?

A I was always of the opinion that Rudolf Hess was far more devoted to his idol than his idol was devoted to him.

Q But I have heard that Hitler considered Hess as a great friend for the discussion of philosophy and subjects such as geopolitics.

A Hitler, who himself was only semi-educated, had noticed that Hess, through his knowledge of books and academic education, was far more educated in these fields than he was himself.

Q Don't you think from that Hitler was influenced a great deal by Hess?

A Hitler knew just as little about these things as Hess knew himself, and I am of the impression that Hess, right up to 1935, at the time he had^{made} his speech in Stockholm, was convinced that everything would come to a peaceful solution.

Q But you haven't answered my question. I maybe haven't made it clear to you. I would like to know if, in your opinion, the ideas that Hitler had with respect to matters relating to geopolitics and other matters that come from books, if you don't think Hitler got many of those ideas from Hess.

(HAUSHOFER)

A He certainly has been told about these things by Hess, but I received the impression, and I am utterly convinced, that Hitler has never understood these things and he did not have the right outlook for understanding them.

Q I understand that his ideas on Lebensraum were never completely explained by Hitler.

A When I formed my opinions on the basis of the English authors and Ratzel and Kjellen and others, Germany at that time was in a very terrible condition as regards frontiers and Lebensraum, and this is why he adopted this conception in many of his speeches because they were very close to him, but without really understanding them.

Q But Hitler, being an uneducated man, would talk at great length on subjects of Lebensraum and geopolitics. Don't you believe he got those ideas from Hess?

A Yes. These ideas came to Hitler from Hess, but he has never really understood them, and he has never really read about them from the original books. He never read these books.

Q Did you ever talk to Hitler?

A Very seldom, because, you see, this was a thing which was often mentioned in your press. My visits to Landsberg always were meant for Hess, he being my pupil. It wasn't really allowed that one visited more than one person, and I was only interested in visiting Rudolf Hess. The situation was that there was only one big room where one could speak and just one little cell where Hess was sitting.

(HAUSHOFER)

Q Isn't it true that Hess collaborated with Hitler in writing "Mein Kampf?"

A As far as I know, Hess actually dictated many chapters of that book. Hess was able to type, while Hitler was not.

Q Then, do I understand that you would discuss these matters with Hess and then Hess in turn would discuss them with Hitler and that is how they got the book?

A In matters where I saw that neither Hitler nor Hess had any geographical idea, I tried to visit Hess and tried to explain to him the basis of Ratzel's book, dealing with political geography, second edition. I point out edition Number Two because then a third edition came out, which was amplified by a Viennese geography expert, Oberhummer, who has modernized this edition.

Q Did you find that in all instances that the correct version that you gave would be adapted by Hitler?

A I always had the impression by his speeches that he never really understood them.

Q But did you have the idea that he had made an attempt to adopt your teachings?

A He sometimes made attempts, but, you see, I remember quite well, whenever Hess understood such a thing and tried to explain it to Hitler, Hitler usually came out with one of his new ideas about an autobahn or anything else which had nothing to do with it, while Hess just stood there and did not say any more about it.

Q But in the main principles, would you say that Hitler's ideas reflected your teachings?

(HAUSHOFER)



A No. One of the most important things he never understood. This is an idea which I heard expressed for the first time by Reich Chancellor Prince Ito of Japan. What I mention here are his words: "The only possibility for solving the Russian problem is with the East Asian culture and the European culture"--he illustrated it with the Russian Troika, meaning that "the stronger horse pulls in the middle while the two other horses pull from either side." And now the most important was: "So that the horse in the middle should not be able to bite any of these horses alone without the other horse taking action." This is the conception that Hitler did not understand.

Q But you never visited Hitler at Landsberg?

A I had never an occasion to speak to Hitler alone. He avoided it. I always had the feeling that he felt a certain distrust, the distrust of a semi-educated person towards a scientifically educated person.

Q Did you talk to him in the presence of anybody else?

A Yes, sometimes in the presence of Rudolf Hess in his small house in Harlacking. That is a suburb of Munich.

Q When was that?

A The last time I could speak to him was on the 8th of November, 1938, before the program. At that time I returned from the Africa conference in Rome. This is where I went with sixteen French and sixteen German experts on African questions and also twenty-four English experts.

(HAUSHOFER)

Q I would like to ask you to limit your answers to my questions.

A Yes. Excuse me.

Q How many times did you see Hitler?

A I saw him the first time in 1922; that was the first time.

At that time I was President of the Munich German People's Party. At first he wanted to disturb that meeting, but later on he decided not to. That was my first impression. He then made the same impression as he made in later years, the same way of combing his hair and so on. Then I saw him twice or three times when going to Landsberg to Rudolf Hess, but only when he was together with his men, with Kruebel, who I knew from the first World War. Kruebel was in my division in the World War, and so I knew him, and he was in that society. There were always nine or ten in that big room.

Then I saw him the next time at the Publisher Burckhardt, when Hess got married. We were there, and Burckhardt and his wife, and Hitler, and Rudolf Hess and his wife and I and the clergyman, whose name I don't recollect any more, and another two or three people.

Really, I never had occasion to speak to him personally. I think he purposely avoided that.

I saw him once more at Rudolf Hess' place, but then there was another Swiss gentleman there and my wife and Rudolf Hess' wife. This constituted the smallest circle in which I ever saw him.

Then I was present at the Fuehrer's conference in the Munich building, but there was a large number of people there, and I was not in his intimate circle.

(HAUSHOFER)

The next time I met him was in Rudolf Hess' house, and at that time he apparently was not agreeable to what I said, namely, that I did not like his policy as regards Africa, and then I suggested that we should go into conference. From that moment I was through with him. Only Rudolf Hess was concerned about me. From 1941 I was the object of persecution by the Gestapo.

Q As I understand you, you had no opportunity at any time to impart to him your teachings?

A No. I tried sometimes with his subordinates if the matter concerned geopolitics. I can prove that every once or twice a year I had to threaten my resignation as President of the German Academy.

Q Who do you think was the inspiration for Hitler when he expressed himself with regard to geopolitics?

A I think he mostly talked about these matters to Ribbentrop, but he had the habit, as he had it with Hess, too, that if something was not agreeable to him, he merely started a different subject and made a big public speech, while the people concerned just looked on with wide open and admiring eyes and could say nothing more.

Q But Ribbentrop did not become Foreign Minister until 1938.

A Yes, but Ribbentrop was assigned in Rudolf Hess' staff to deal with foreign political affairs.

Q When?

A This was at the time before he went to London as an Ambassador.

Q Did you talk with Ribbentrop?

A By order of Rudolf Hess I had to speak to Ribbentrop again

(HAUSHOFER)

about the East Asiatic questions as he did not understand anything about them, and my friend, who has since been shot by the Gestapo, and I had to teach him map reading about which he didn't know anything, because he was not very good at that.

Q Did you find that Ribbentrop was agreeable to your teachings?

A As long as it was necessary for him to learn these things, he accepted them.

Q Who would you say had the most influence with Hitler; was it Hess or Ribbentrop, with respect to your teachings?

A Hitler never was really influenced by Hess very much, but he thought rightly to be able to count on his devotion, but he really in the end treated him very badly.

Q What about Ribbentrop?

A In order to speak the naked truth, I have to say that Ribbentrop just used Hess in order to climb into position in the Foreign Office, and when he got there he, together with Bormann, just pushed Hess overboard.

Q But wherever there occurred any statements by Hitler upon subjects that you taught, would you say that Hitler got those ideas from Hess or from Ribbentrop?

A I think he got those ideas from Ribbentrop through one of these young gentlemen in the Foreign Office who really read my books and was more capable of understanding them. I am afraid I do not know these names by heart any more.

Q Then you believe that the expressions that Hitler made were in fact a reflection of your ideas as contained in your books?

(HAUSHOFER)

A They were nearly always misunderstood. For instance, he has never really understood the difference that I made between oceanic and continental policy.

Q But when you explained that there was a misunderstanding, would you go to Hess and try to straighten him out so they would get your ideas?

A Yes. Then I tried to go to Hess. I have given you an example of one matter in which our scientific objections were pushed aside.

Q There was always an attempt on your part to try to get your ideas into operation through Hess and to Hitler?

A I always told him about them whenever I had a feeling that things were done in the wrong manner.

Q When you say "in the wrong manner," you mean contrary to your teachings?

A Contrary to my teaching and what I thought was necessary in order to establish peace in this Roman conference.

Q You were sincere in all of the things that you taught?

A I think that whatever I have written, I have written to the best of my capability and knowledge. I have to say here that I am a very incomplete scientist.

Q But you haven't answered the question. You were always sincere in everything that you taught?

A Yes.

Q When you say that things would go wrong or that Hitler would have a mistaken idea about something, you mean by that that he would do something contrary to what you were teaching?

(HAUSHOFER)

A Yes, absolutely contrary to my opinions and my teaching. In order to give a short example: Prague, the breaking of the Munich agreement.

Q When you would see those things, you would then go to Hess and try to persuade him to have Hitler change his tactics?

A I have tried that and I have had some very bad experiences and at last, as you well know, I had to be in Dachau as a result of that.

Q Why did you go to the jail at Landsberg?

A Because Rudolf Hess has been my pupil and I am not used to leaving comrades and pupils alone.

Q What did you talk about?

A Mainly about his work. I talked to him about geography.

Q Were they at that time preparing the book "Mein Kampf"?

A Hitler dictated the most part of the book "Mein Kampf" in jail in Landsberg. Afterwards when they came out, he gave me the book to read and he asked me to review it in my periodical. That is after it had been printed already. Hess brought me that book so that I could review it in my periodical.

Q Isn't it a fact that some parts of that book were written by you?

A No. This is not a fact. Usually I am not conceited, but I must say that I never could have written such a bad book.

Q Well, in making your review, did you give many suggestions to Hess for making changes in the book?

(HAUSHOFER)

A I only saw the book after it had been finished in printed form, and he wanted me to make a review and I told him "No". The book has nothing to do with geopolitics. "I can't write a review," I said. No where in any German newspaper will you find a line of mine about the book.

Q Are you familiar with Chapter 14?

A I must honestly say that I don't know it.

Q In this chapter there is a great deal about Lebensraum and about the need of living space.

A Naturally, Hess had heard a lot about these matters in my lectures between 1920 and 1924. I had to speak about these things in order to be honest.

Q Don't you find a great similarity between the contents of the book and your teachings with regard to Lebensraum and such methods?

A No, I am sure that he did not understand many parts of my ideas as to Lebensraum. For instance, I often pointed out to him that our policy of concentrating people in cities was a wrong one, and I pointed out to him the difference in some of the Eastern countries that were far more thickly populated than our own country.

Q Did you find anything in the book that was consonant with your teachings, agreeable to your teachings?

A No. I must say that when Rudolf Hess brought me the book first time--I think it was in '35, soon after its publication--I was quite unhappy. When I first saw this book I was very much against it, apart from other things also because of his racial ideas. I don't know if the Colonel knows that I have been married to a non-Aryan happily for the last fifty years.

(HAUSHOFER)

Q Yes. Well, you understand, though, that that was the center of the National Socialist Party?

A No. In the first years I thought all those things constituted Party slogans in order to obtain a following.

Q Did you think that they started out with deceit?

A I think this was because of the tenseness of the situation. I don't know whether the Colonel realizes how tense the situation in Germany was in the years between 1920 and 1924.

Q I know that, but you say that you disagreed with the methods that were set forth in that book. I am just wondering what you did about it.

A I have been approached, for instance, to join the Party, which I declined. Also later on the syndicus of the university approached me and asked me to take over the position of a director on condition that I divorce my wife, which I declined. I told the men not to enter my house again. This was in 1933. m d m

Q '33?

A '33.

Q So then from 1922 to 1933, you were in complete disagreement with the principles of the National Socialist Party?

A I wasn't in any Party, but if I was close at all to any Party it was the Party of Stresemann, the German People's Party.

Q But during all that time you maintained your close friendship with Hess?

A Yes, that was the old friendship of an old soldier towards a young soldier.

(HAUSHOFER)

Q Do you mean General Haushofer would do that?

A Yes. He meant me. I want to point out that I was alternatively called "Professor" and "General." Here I also want to say that whenever I spoke about Hitler, I never referred to him as "Fuehrer" but I always referred to him as "Tribune," such as, what is our People's Tribune doing"?

Q Did you know that Bohle translated all his notes?

A Whose notes?

Q Hess' notes before he went to England.

A That I don't know, no, because, you see, my relation to Bohle I can say was a very unfriendly one. I have to say that Bohle tried to bring into his control all the people's organizations in foreign countries. At last he also tried to win control over the German Association for Germans in foreign countries, and this is the occasion when I asked to resign.

Q Getting back to the early days, did you cooperate with Hess in the formation of the Party or in the performance of his work?

A No, never. I never had anything to do with Party organizations. I have never been a member of the Party, and when I was first approached by Hess and he asked me to become a member of the Party, I answered him like this: "I do not have the inclination of becoming a Party comrade."

Q Hess became number two man in Germany, didn't he?

A I think this burden was far too big for him, not for his heart and character, but considering his intelligence.

(HAUSHOFER)



Q But during all that time you counseled with him, did you?

A If he asked me about any certain subjects, I gave him honest advice, which has only very seldom been adhered to.

Q Now, you held many positions of honor during that period?

A Both of these honorary posts that I held were given to me on a purely democratic basis. The post of President of the German Academy has been given to me by free choice of the Senate. The same applies to my successor, but not unfortunately to the one that followed him. The same applied to the V.B.A., the German people's group in foreign countries. The Presidents of the individual groups were elected by a choice, and those Presidents in turn elected their President. At the time when I was elected, this organization had nothing at all to do with the Party, but was quite a free electing body. Afterwards, after my departure, Bohle tried to bring this organization into his frame and there, in my opinion, he ruined it.

Q Were they free organizations?

A They were both free organizations, and the contribution for this organization was a voluntary one.

Q What was the purpose of the organization?

A The German Academy has been founded in the year 1923 to 1924. I took part in the foundation, and we had as our aim to start a similar Academy, as the Academy de France and the Institute de France.

Q Wasn't it a part of the propaganda machine?

A No. In that time it was not propaganda. You see, I had a secretary, Doctor Tierfelder, who always tried to speak about the propaganda. I told him "Everybody who uses only the word propaganda

(HAUSHOFER)

has to put twenty marks in a box for misusing that word," because I had the impression that the mere mention of the word "propaganda" would ruin the aim of the Academy.

Q But you did stay on propaganda work, even though you didn't use the word?

A Unfortunately, after my departure from the Academy, it has become dependent on the Ministry of Propaganda and then, of course, was subject to propaganda work; and in my opinion this was very harmful to the original theme of the academy.

Q How long did you hold the positions in this?

A Then I left because I had differences with the President. He was a Catholic Prelate. We were friends at first, but he had ways of which I didn't approve. I can prove my friendship to him by the fact that I put a bouquet of roses on the pietat in Rome on his behalf. In '34 I was reelected to the Senate, which office ran from 1934 to 1937, but then I resigned because I had the impression that the freedom of the Academy was going to be disturbed.

(Pietà)
a statue of Christ in the arms of Mary, after the crucifixion by M. Angelo.
(Walsh)

Q What gave you that impression?

A This impression I received because of the interference of Bohle and the Minister of Propaganda.

Q Well, Bohle was very careful not to get into the propaganda?

A I was always surprised whenever I went to Berlin how much energy was used by these people in fighting each other.

Q But is that the only reason you resigned because of the internal friction?

(HAUSHOFER)



A There was a very excited Senate meeting and at the end things were adjusted, and I refused a medal, but I resigned just the same.

Q What were the functions of Bohle?

A After the unfortunate development of the foreign Gau and being very hungry for power after this position, he tried to interfere into different fields.

Q Wasn't he careful always to keep his work among German Nationals abroad?

A Yes. He always has tried to do that, but he was a man very hungry for power, and he always thought that he could substitute science through mere organization.

Q When you were President, what did this organization do?

A We initiated many courses for languages, especially in Greece, Bulgaria, and even in Belgrade. We met with big success in that, but unfortunately we could only pay very small fees to the people we engaged, but they were inspired by very much idealism.

Q During that time, didn't you always maintain a constant contact with the military high command?

A No. I had from before many scientific relationships to Italy and to Hungary, where my best friend, a count, who shot himself, and the King of Rumania had real scientific interests on geopolitics, and I had friends in Paris who published my books.

Q That isn't quite responsive to my question. I wanted to know if you didn't have a contact with the high command of the military?

*Teleki?
(Walsh)*

(HAUSHOFER)



A No. Really, no. I knew Fritsche, and I knew from my old military times also Beck, and I knew Kleist, and I knew Brauchitsch, from his time in East Prussia, because he had real interests for the Baltic States. I gave lectures in the Reval and at Stockholm.

Q But didn't you lecture to military schools?

A No. My lectures were in a big Swedish society. I have now and again been invited by a regiment, but this was an exception. For instance, old friends from campaigns now and again invited me, but these were mostly scientific societies. I held quite a number of lectures all over Germany.

Q When you lectured at the military schools, what subjects did you lecture on?

A Eastern Asia, Pacific questions, Indian questions.

Q Russian?

A Seldom Russia, but also Russia. I knew Russia, Vladivostock.

Q They were lectures on geopolitics?

A Yes, that, too.

Q How many of those lectures did you give to the military?

A Lectures to the military constituted the smallest part of my lectures. The most part of my lectures were given to the geographical societies.

Q Were those lectures given at regular intervals?

A No, only on invitation, but I spoke also in the societies of Kadenhof, Kalegeri, in Prague.

(Kadenhof-Kalergi)

(HAUSHOFER)

Q If that has nothing to do with military, let us not talk about it. What I want to know is whether or not you maintained an interest and a relationship with the military during all these years.

A No. I tried to be independent and to remain independent. That was my pride.

Q As an old soldier, you did keep in contact with the military?

A Yes. I had personal contact with many old comrades. They were old friends. My last Adjutant of the World War is now General von Oxner.

Q You were aware, weren't you, of the secret rearmament of Germany.

A One ~~has~~ kept these matters away from me. This is the reason why I brought this speech of Rudolf Hess in Stockholm along. These matters have been kept secret from me long after 1935. This has been our honest conviction, what is contained in this speech.

Q How do you explain the fact that many of your teachings found practical application in the Nazi Foreign Policy?

A There is only one sensible geopolitics, and every sensible man who understands it will apply it.

Q Well, then, you think that with respect to the foreign policy that your teachings were observed and there was no disagreement on your part?

A I have always been looked upon in the foreign countries as a decent geopolitician, especially in England. Otherwise I would not

(HAUSHOFER)



have become an honorable member of the British Legion. The badge of the British Legion was given to me by Lieutenant Glive.

Q General, when you noticed that there was imposed on the German people a rigid internal control and that there was a secret rearmament of Germany, putting those two things together with your teachings, did you come to any conclusions?

A Up to the Autumn of 1938, I hoped that we should come out of this whole affair in a peaceful way. You see, my murdered son spoke about those questions with Henderson, and I also spoke with many big Englishmen. I didn't know many Americans, but some Americans also. At the African conference in Rome I hoped with all my heart and also my life that we have reached a most extreme point and we thought that the word that we had given would be kept and we did not want to extend over that word.

Q That was your hope, General, but when you saw this rearmament going on, when you saw this tight internal control exercised, and putting that with the theory of Lebensraum, didn't you know that sometime that there was an aggressive warfare soon to start?

A You see, in that moment I had my last encounter. This is when I had my decisive encounter with Hitler on the 8th of November, 1938. This is when all my power was taken away from me. I was still protected as long as Hess was still here, but not after the time Hess had left.

Q That was the day when they announced the revenge action against the Jews?

A Yes, that was the day when this powerful action had taken place.

(HAUSHOFER)

wife
(His wife was his constant adviser and co-worker in Geopolitics)
(Walsh)



Q But you know as a military man that the basic concept of the German military plans called for the waging of war outside the boundaries of Germany?

A At that time I hoped that the agreement with Bohemia was going to be adhered to and that there would be no war.

Q But didn't you notice the increase in armament, the rigid internal control, the fact that the basic concept of waging war outside of the boundaries together with the theory of Lebensraum, could only mean one thing and that would be war?

A If we had been satisfied with what was given to us in Munich and if we had been prepared not to extend(over)that, we would have had tasks to last us for a hundred years within the European Lebensraum.

*beyond
(Walsh)*

Q What did you think Germany was going to use this great striking force of its army for?

A I had hoped that a conference would be brought about in the autumn of 1938 which would clear up questions of Danzig and the Corridor, and all these hopes of mine have been destroyed by this pogrom of November '38.

Q Was that the first time that you came to any conclusion with respect to the waging of war?

A Then I saw that all this was leading to destruction.

Q But you knew, didn't you, that it was part of the program that they were to take on the territory of Austria and the Sudetenland in addition to Danzig and the Corridor problem?

(HAUSHOFER)



(they)
A At that time they already had Austria and the Sudetenland.
I really thought that all these assurances that were given to me,
namely, that one was now satisfied, that all these assurances were
given to me in earnest. At that time, after Munich, in Rome, there
was such a happy feeling of cooperation and such contentment, not
only among Germans but also among Englishmen and so on, and I
returned home with the biggest of hopes.

⊕ i-2
after the
African
Conference
held in Rome.
(Walsh)

APPROVED

W. A. Brundage
Col. J. A. S. D.
Interrogator

Siegmund Rauber
Interpreter

William P. Weigel
Reporter



Seen:

Edmund A. Walsh
Consultant.

~~~~~  
At this point the interrogation was  
taken over by Dr. Walsh, alone.

(HAUSHOFER)

*Continuation of Col. Brundage's  
Interrogation - same session*

Testimony of Karl Haushofer, taken  
at Nurnberg, Germany, 5 October 1945,  
1600-1700, by Dr. Edmund A. Walsh,  
Expert Consultant to Justice Jackson.  
Also present: Siegfried Ramler, Inter-  
preter and S/Sgt William A. Weigel,  
Court Reporter.

DR. WALSH TO THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will interpret from Eng-  
lish into German and from German into English all the questions  
put and answered during this interrogation?

A I do.

Q Will you state your name?

A Siegfried Ramler.

Q What is your present duty?

A Interpreter.

DR. WALSH TO THE WITNESS THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the  
whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in answer to the questions  
of this interrogation, so help you God?

A Yes.

Q Were you in favor of the Anschluss?

A Yes, because I had the impression that many, many people  
in Austria, some of whom were very highly estimated by me, really  
liked the idea of a great German Reich. However, they had quite a  
different idea as to the execution of this plan. You see, if I  
had any power to arrange that, I would have never taken any non-

Austrians into it.

Q But still what concerns us very much is this; that in November, 1934, that the Zeitschrift, the journal of geopolitics, of which you were the editor, said in that number, November '34, that "eventually a great power must take over the protection of that space". I don't say that you said it, but it was in the magazine.

A I gave my authors in my paper a very great freedom. Over myself, however, I had four censors who censored me very strictly, but I was not as silly as to try to censor my own authors, too.

Q The point that disturbs us is that the Zeitschrift during those years in a way prepared for the violent taking of those lands later, prepared the public.

A I know many Austrians, and I knew that they could not carry on living in the conditions that they were living in then.

Q That would be another question, but the point is whether or not the Zeitschrift itself advocated and wished to bring about a forceful Anschluss.

A The best thing would be the voluntary Anschluss, which actually has been tried, but which did not succeed. I had a lot of correspondence with Seippel, whom I consider now as the most brilliant statesman that Austria ever had. And I am sure that he would have always wanted at least an economic Anschluss to Germany. In a letter that he wrote to me from Switzerland at the time when he was ill, which unfortunately I have lost, he wrote to me that

"it is important that an economic Anschluss in Germany be arranged".

Z.f.G  
Q It will be noted in June '37 that for the most part, the magazine ~~Seippel~~ <sup>Z.f.G</sup> was devoted to Czechoslovakia, with the many articles and maps indicating that that country also ought to come under German domain. Is that true?

A Yes, that is possible. Bohemia really was the heart of Europe from where Karl IV has ruled.

Q The point is, did that Zeitschrift attempt to bring about, as far as it could, the domination of Czechoslovakia without any requests, as came from Seippel?

  
A We have really thought that a solution as has been found in Munich would have been the happiest solution that could have been found in Europe at that time if we only had been satisfied with it. This was a decisive thing. One could have absolutely been satisfied with it.

Q But as far as we can gather from your writings, even before that, you believed that all small nations eventually should be absorbed by the great powers.

A I did, but what I mean is that Europe was far too small and was distributed in far too small a manner so as to find any economic solution without any unified program.

Q But would that not run close to and violate the international rights, and the wills of each one of those peoples, if they so desired to remain independent?

A Yes, but you have found such a solution, too, <sup>[in USA]</sup> and you are

happy.

Q But we did it by voluntary solution.

A The solution in Austria and the solution in Czechoslovakia, if one would have been satisfied with it, would have shown the way to such a solution.

Q I don't understand that.

A This solution as it has been found in the Spring of 1938 with Austria, and later on in 1938 with Czechoslovakia, should have been the lead to the solution as it was to be found all over Europe, over middle Europe.

Q But the solution with Austria was a forced solution against the wishes of its government and an independent government.

A If you would have been in Austria, you would see yourself that at that time the bigger part of the population was for the union, but in quite another way. They were for the union, but for the union in a different manner. They were against ~~the~~ German officials being sent to Austria. They wanted to keep their administration to themselves.

Q Then why was Hitler so much afraid of allowing the Austrian people to have their own plebiscite?

A A plebiscite has taken place before, and when it has taken place before, it was in favor of the Anschluss. If it were I, I

would have tolerated this plebiscite.

Q Tolerated which one?

A I would even have tolerated the second one.

Q But with regard to the second one, I have just come from Austria to study that question, and I am informed that when the invasion took place, some small regions distant, that didn't know about it, had their plebiscite, in many villages and towns, and it was 100% against the Anschluss at that time.

A On the other side of the picture, I have seen how people have behaved, people like Hassinger, the President of the Viennese Academy.

Q But in studying your works over many years, over twenty years, I get the impression that it is not these specific economic problems, but a program to displace the power of the British Empire in the world, as exemplified by this map.

A (Examining map.) You see, that is from Hetner. That is not my work. That is out of Hetner's English book.

Q But you published it in your own works with approval. That is your own book.

A Yes, I know, but, you see, you know that I have written a biography of Herr von Kitchener, which has been so sympathetically taken up in England, and I knew him personally, and I consider him the most brilliant man that I have ever come across; and I have always admired England as being a country of art, and people knew about this man's opinions.

Q Yet, when you went to Korea in 1909, you remember that you said that you were very much disturbed when you made that trip to see the Union Jack all through those lands, and the first real moment of contentment you had was when you saw the Japanese flag at Formosa?

A I had the impression that it is fortunate that not all the world is under one flag, but that still there are independent countries with independent culture and flags.

Q But your impressions about Japan and what you were alleging then was something more than merely an independent culture. They were that Japan would serve as the nemesis for the white man in the Far East to throw him out.

A I refer to many bad things the white man has committed in East Asia, if you, and I, had inspected different quarters of the East Asian ports, Vladivostock and so on, you would have received the impression that the white man has committed crimes against his own culture.

Q That I <sup>might</sup> agree to, but my point is that I understand from your answers that the reason for the activity at that time was merely to arrange an economic union with Austria; that there was no other motive. My point in bringing this out and many others is that there seems to be a deeper motive finally, and not that one alone that transpired in Austria, and, therefore, I suggested that this <sup>map</sup> showed another wider program.

A It is a feeling of the Bavarian that the Salzach border is very unjust. Salzach is the border of the Bavarian circle. Salzburg used to be the cultural center.

Q I understand that, but I think that gets away from my main question. The main question was, whatever have been the reasons for the Austrian-German frontiers, I am merely emphasizing that that wasn't the only one, wasn't the deepest motivation in the movement at that time: first, Austria, then Czechoslovakia, then something else, then something else, then something else.

A It is the basic feeling of a Bavarian that his centers are being separated by artificial borders, because if a Bavarian would, for instance, fly across the country and look down on the different landmarks, he would feel himself in Bavaria irrespective of whether he was then over any Austrian territory or German Territory.

Q I understand all that, but why should that same feeling extend itself over so many lands, in favor of German imperialism?

A The Bavarian always thinks that he belongs to Bavaria irrespective of whether there is an artificial border in the middle or not.

Q I understand that, but I want <sup>you</sup> to come back to my question, that this idea of progressive expansion is not justified by the different countries in the area. For example, I find here in the magazine Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik, in February 1939, pages 131

and 132, certain statements <sup>by you.</sup> Would you explain these ~~testaments~~ <sup>statements</sup> in your periodical?

(At this point Dr. Walsh showed the witness a copy of the Zeitschrift fur Geopolitik in which an article appeared by Haushofer, containing much abuse of the United States as ruled by "Jewish plutocrats" and "space-devouring" imperialists. On reading it, Haushofer broke down emotionally, tears came into his eyes, and he could barely speak. As he had suffered a heart attack yesterday which needed medical attention, and as it could easily happen again under these conditions, Dr. Walsh terminated the session and fixed Saturday, October 6th, 2:30 P.M. for the next hearing.)



APPROVED: Edmund T. Walsh  
INTERROGATOR

Siefried Rauha  
INTERPRETER

William A. Weigel  
COURT REPORTER

Dr. Walsh was named specifically by Justice Jackson to conduct this and the following interrogation of Haushofer.  
E.A.H.

Testimony of: KARL HAUSHOFER  
Taken at: Nuremberg, Germany  
1430 - 1630, 6 October 1945.  
By: Dr. Edmund A. Walsh, Expert  
Consultant to Justice Jackson.  
Interpreter: Siegfried Ramler  
Reporter: S/Sgt. William A. Weigel

QUESTIONS BY DR. WALSH TO THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will faithfully interpret from English into German and from German into English all the questions put and answered during this interrogation?

A I do.

Q Will you state your name?

A Siegfried Ramler.

Q What are your present duties?

A Interpreter.

QUESTIONS BY DR. WALSH TO THE WITNESS THROUGH THE INTERPRETER:

Q Do you solemnly swear that you will tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, in answer to the questions of this interrogation, so help you God?

A Yes.

Q You will remember that yesterday we covered with great detail some of the early developments of the Party and your early speeches and all of that?

A Yes.

Q Then at the end we came to a certain question which I put to you from the Zeitschrift?

A Yes.

Q You will recollect that when you read that, you felt that it didn't represent now what you might have thought at that time?

A I have to say now that these considerations <sup>had</sup> been inspired too much



by passion, that is, after reading many attacks in the English and American press, but I want to say now that had I spent all my life as a scientist, I would not have written them the way I did.

Q Well, can we assume from that that possibly some of the earlier conclusions which we came to might now be in your opinion not true and might be modified in the light of more serious reflection upon them?

A Right now I would neither write such things, nor would I have them printed, nor would I represent any such thoughts.

Q Would you feel that some at least or maybe many of your original points of view, not only that particular one, but others, have been demonstrated in the course of time to lack basic justification?

A The information that we had here was never very complete and although I perhaps had better information than the rest of the Germans with regard to Japan and China, it really was not sufficient then.

Q You mentioned that extenuating circumstance as of the date '35?

A Ever since 1935, the information I had was very scarce.

Q Well, that I could understand with regard to daily occurrences and world movements, but I find that even before that date, before that date, you had very definite beliefs and teachings extended to others, such as, one, in the Zeitschrift fur Politik No. 12, 1935, pages 445 to 448: "Geopolitics is a duty to safeguard the rights to the soil, to the land, and in the widest sense not only the land within the frontiers of the Deutschesreich, but the right to much more extensive folk and cultural land."

A This related to things with which I was very happy and content, such as the cultural autonomy of Ostland; that was such an example. The result of cultural independent life in decisions, and an example for that constitutes Ostland also, perhaps, even Siebenbuergen.

Q But this is only one expression, and I must say this is not limited to any Ostland, but this is a universal expression.

A I am convinced that it is the task of everybody to satisfy the cultural needs of all the minorities of their own account and with their own cultural autonomous rights.

Q Yes, but still the writings of most of the geopoliticians, and in the Zeitschrift also, rather concluded that wherever Germanic culture went and wherever Germanic populations were found, even though they were under another country, there finally must go German political right.

A This is a one-sided point of view which I did not have. You can see that by one example which I am going to give you now. In 1935 I was taken along to conferences and speeches that were held in Baltic countries, and I want to give you those speeches which I have here and in which there is contained the point of view as it was believed at that time and which was also Rudolf Hess' point of view. Should you not have this speech, I want to tell you now that this speech was his conviction and he was completely sincere, as I can say under oath, in everything that he expressed in this speech.

Q I would like to know, however, does this statement refer also to your personal beliefs, because we are not at this moment interrogating Rudolf Hess, but does it represent your feelings?

A This was Hess' and my conviction at that time, and I never would have made all of these speeches which I made in Stockholm and Oslo if I was not under the impression and did not believe it was never meant to take away any of these countries and incorporate them into Germany, but the only intention was to permit cultural rights of the Germans minorities there. At that time it was mine and Rudolf Hess' sincere conviction.

Q Still you did say in the second edition of Grensen in 1939, you quoted with approval the famous dictum of Spinoza: "Everyone has as much right in the world as his power enables him to have."

A The power that I meant here was not meant as a military power, but a distinction has to be made in the Latin word of "potentia" that has been also used.

Q But in the context in which you expressed this approbation I believe that the whole question of that moment was physical power.

A This I cannot remember exactly. You see, I have the poor memory belonging to an old man.

Q You see, what disturbs us so much and what we are trying to clarify is whether or not your teachings and your influence and contact with the great leaders encouraged them and laid designs for an aggressive physical invasion.

A If you believe that, you have completely misunderstood me. You can see from my action since 1938 that I was against any forcible measures not counting these territories that we had at that time. My opposition to that is proved by the persecution to which I was subjected from that date onwards.

Q I agree to that to a great extent; but what they gathered and used from your teachings was a very destructive conclusion, and to some extent in your previous teachings you encouraged them to that, and I will give you an example. In the Zeitschrift No. 13 of 1936, page 247, you exhorted the German people: "Do not be narrow minded, but think in large terms of great things, in continents and oceans, and thereby direct your course with that of your Fuehrer."

A I wrote these things at the time when I was under the impression that great injustices were being committed against us, and I never would have written these things if I had been under my present impression. But the remarks that I made there, that is, to speak in terms of oceans and continents, are not my remarks

but I have taken that from famous British authors, from Mackinder.

Q Mackinder and many others have also had a world geographical <sup>consciousness</sup> ~~concept~~; that I understand. But in this year, '36, you added that those world geographical ideas of the Heartland should be developed according to the course which the Fuehrer was thinking.

A Adolf Hitler at that time made <sup>some</sup> reasonable speeches, that is, in 1936.

A I grant you the force of that argument.

A The moment it was asked that I express views in my monthly periodical which I did not share and which I was not convinced of, from that moment on I <sup>to</sup> ceased publishing these monthly periodicals, and at that time I told him, "Try to find somebody else." With this I mean my radio speeches, which were called world political monthly reviews.

Q Still, I find after the invasion of Russia in 1941 in the Zeitschrift appeared a statement over your name in which you seemed to approve of the invasion of Russia.

A Is that really my newspaper?

Q Not this document, no, but I will look up the reference. September 1940 <sup>(4)</sup> issue of the Zeitschrift. But even afterwards it has been brought to my attention that there seemed to be some statements of yours, even after the invasion. Do you recollect having written any after the invasion of Russia?

A It is impossible for me to have spoken anything over the radio or written any such statement, because I would not have been allowed to do so after the flight of Hess, because after the flight of Rudolf Hess, I was even not allowed to make a very humble speech at the session of the German academy that I was invited to and not allowed to go to a scientific congress in the Rhineland. At that time I was not allowed to go out of my home without special permission. That can't be.

Q Still I have been informed, though I do have here before me the exact number of the Zeitschrift, consequently you have the right to question it, I have been informed that in April 1941 . . .

A I was in Rome at that time.

Q You published a geopolitical interpretation of the mission to China of Owen Latimore, who was the American advisor to Chiang Kai-Shek, and you seemed to feel then that there were some maneuvers going on which you ~~discovered~~ <sup>described</sup> as "machinations prepared with ice-cold far-sightedness."

A I have a very good impression of his knowledge and far-sightedness as regarding the Far East.

Q That particular incident is not extremely important at the moment. What I am really trying to clarify is whether or not after the declaration of war on Russia, did you continue to edit the Zeitschrift and approve the policy of the Fuehrer then?

A I wanted to go away from the Zeitschrift even before the flight of Rudolf Hess, but I was not allowed and I was told, "If you go away from the Zeitschrift, your wife will go to Teresienstadt or Auschwitz and you will go to Dachau."

Q I understand, therefore, that you continued the editorship?

A I could not do otherwise.

Q Under duress?

A Yes. We were forbidden only in the middle of 1944, and then the last number was allowed to round out the year. The Zeitschrift and the threat of the internment of my wife, that is, her being sent to Tersienstadt or Auschwitz, has always been over my head like the sword of Damocles.

Q Therefore you suggested to us with all honesty that if anything did

appear which appeared to justify the aggressive warfare of Hitler, it was under duress?

A It was. Because I always had over me for all things I wrote personally four censorships: one universal for newspapers, one of the military, because I was formerly a General; there was a censorship, the one of the Minister of Propaganda. I want to be able to mention one thing too, whether I had relations to military authorities formerly. Here you have the proof which you can read right now which I am handing over to you that already in 1935 a geopolitical speech of mine, quite a harmless geopolitical speech of mine, has been forbidden by the General Staff.

Q You submitted this text beforehand?

A I had given this text to Friedrich Heiss, and he in turn gave it to the General Staff, and in spite of its harmlessness it was forbidden; and I am sure the Professor will agree that the contents of this is so harmless that I am sure over America there would have been no difficulty in publishing it.

Q Who was he?

A The secretary of Dr. Heiss, who was the editor of this newspaper. I think it was called "Die Strasse." He is the editor of the periodical "Volk und Reich," but this article was meant for his Zeitschrift, "Die Strasse."

Q This is what it says:

"Dear General: Just returning from an official journey, I want to tell you this. Before I started this journey I had the Edition #12 of "Die Strasse," and I now find the opinion of your War Ministry in relation to your article. Dear General, will you please take my assurance that I am very sad and very worried about this decision. This, your article, has been the source of great joy and distinction to us, and we would have been very glad to win you over as our collaborator, and now, unfortunately, our intention has been destroyed.

I can assure you that all of us, also Dr. Haushofer, after it has been reported to him, have been very sorry about this decision. As per your request, I can now send back the draft of your article, which is enclosed hereby. Naturally, the publishing agency will give you the fee for your article and will send it to you within a few days."

The signature ~~is~~ closes with "Heil Hitler!" and "Dr. Frederick Heiss."

A This article would be very important for you to read, because at that time I said that all the resistances that Bavaria could offer would not hold up any enemy for the period of four weeks.

Q What date was this article prepared for?

A The 12th of June, 1935.

Q Could you tell us why at that time you deemed it relevant to point out that Bavaria could not make more than four weeks' resistance? Was there any question of an invasion or war at that time?

A I was asked to write about this new autobahn which ran from Ingolstadt over Munich to Salzburg. I said that this road only had a cultural-political value, but no military value at all. The only value for this road would be a continuation of traffic towards the West and the East.

Q I understand that. I am interested to know, though, why this discussion of the military value of it was raised. Were you asked to comment on its political value, or was that an expression of your own?

A I had to speak about the geopolitical value of this road as a whole, and somebody in the General Staff did not like the opinions that I voiced in this article.

Q Do you wish me to have this for our use?

A Yes. It was never printed. It is the proof that the General Staff was not in agreement with my geopolitical way of thinking.

Q You will remember that Hitler achieved complete control of the German

State by the elections of the 5th of March, 1933. One month later, in the Zeitschrift for April '33 you will remember you published an editorial, which was also signed by your son, <sup>Albrecht</sup> Albert Haushofer, who was killed by the Gestapo, and also Kurt Worwinkel and by General Haushofer, in which you said: "German geopolitical planning will have to exploit fully the dynamic changes and revolutionary movements of our earth. Geopolitics, therefore, is bound to generate immense explosive power." Do you remember that editorial? These I do not say are the exact German expressions, but that was the general idea. What I should like to ask is, what do you mean by "Geopolitics is bound to generate immense explosive power?"

A That was a time when even in Italy the opinion was expressed that it was not clever to change whole peoples into explosive minds. At that time, there was the question of the whole interior removement of Germany, the reformation of the Gaus, and so on. By the fact that the publisher himself signed this article, too, you can see that the question at that time was either the continuance or the discontinuance of the Zeitschrift.

Q At that point, would you agree, however, that the phrasing of the editorial might give rise to the conclusion that it would serve as an explosive power -- I am concerned with the spirit, you see -- that it would serve as an explosive power in the new epoch about to begin.

A I partly wanted to warn and partly I agreed with these sentiments. It has to be clear to you that ever since 1933 I was not a free man any longer. From this moment I was unable to emigrate. I was every moment under threat that my wife would be sent to Teresienstadt or Auschwitz and both my sons would be relieved of their offices.

Q I understand that point of view. Would you, therefore, wish us to conclude that the sword of Damocles also is the explanation of the chapter in your "Wehr Geopolitiks", which I have before me here, that that explanation underlies or is the cause of the special chapter you have in this book on Wehr politics,

the edition after the war began, which you entitled "Die Wehr Geopolitiks of the Liberation War of the Axis Powers," because in reading this chapter it seems to me that it is an apologia for the tactics which the Army was pursuing and the objective, and this comes after the date we are speaking of?

A I must admit to you that ever since 1938 I have wanted to be able to resign from public life, but I was never allowed to do so.

Q I take cognizance of that explanation. I should also like to know whether my interpretation, however, of this chapter is correct.

A Your views regarding this chapter I, unfortunately, have to say are quite correct. At that time I really had the intention to end my life, but I have to say that because of my wife and the five children which she had brought into the world and the threat that was over her to be sent to Teresienstadt, I could not follow such course.

Q What I chiefly wish to assure myself is that I have not misread nor misunderstood.

A No, you are quite right. It is very hard to say. To be truthful, I have to say that Rudolf Hess has never taken part in any of the pressure that has been put on me. There were only others that did that.

Q Without going further into that particular aspect, I do feel I ought to mention one more thing. Is it true that you were a member of the Academy of German Law?

A That is true, but only as an honorary member. I never worked in it. Two or three times they took over matters which I dealt with in my broadcast, and incorporated them in the Zeitschrift periodical. I was only there once more at a supper that was given in the Hotel Vierjahreszeiten in Munich, where I was invited, because of the presence there of my friend Hans Fehr, who was a professor at the Bern University.

Q Then you would wish us to understand that that is the explanation of your article in the Zeitschrift, Academy for German Right, which is published in the year 1936, Page 900 of the Zeitschrift? That is your article?

A Yes.

5 Q In which you speak of the legal system and the fighting spirit, the military spirit and military geopolitics in relation to the legal system and national spirit?

A I think I have written this article for the -- I think he was at that time -- still Minister of Justice, Guertner. I wanted to do this for him because I knew him from my Bavarian past, and he always appeared as a decent man to me then. He later on died.

Q We would not be interested in the origin of the article, but the fact that it was a part of the work of the Academy fuer Deutsches Reich.

A This is what the at that time Minister of Justice asked me to do, and I found nothing wrong in fulfilling his wish.

Q The reason why we are very much interested in the work of the Academy for German Right is this: We find that many of the laws governing occupied lands, very severe and cruel laws, were in all probability first elaborated and worked out by the members of this academy before being passed over to the political authorities.

A But I have never concerned myself with any of these things, and it was well known that I never would agree to go into any of these things, apart from general geopolitical considerations.

Q You said that you were an honorary member?

A At that time, this was presented to me as a merely formal affair.

Q But, nevertheless, in the official list of the Academy published for the year 1933-34, your name occurs as a regular member.

11  
-13-

(Haushofer)

A I have never concerned myself with any of these things you refer to, and if they listed me as a regular member, I am quite sure that I did not know about it. My conception always was that I was merely an honorary member. I had a book once where I noted down my membership in all different geographical associations and other committees, whether honorary member or regular member, but this book unfortunately is missing.

Q At this point the official list of members is shown to you with your name as a regular member.

A (Examining book.) At the time Calker became honorary member and I became an honorary one, too, and I am surprised seeing him here as a regular member, too. I am sorry that I am in here, but there is nothing I can do about it. I remember having filled out a very long questionnaire, where I noted down all my memberships in the different associations, but this has been so distant from my mind that I did not even fill out this membership here.

Q The point which interests us also is that, whereas the other men were, as far as we know, mostly lawyers, you were the only one that we can see who was not a lawyer.

A Calker was no lawyer. Calker was a professor of national economy. At the time they made these celebrations and invited these people, they invited a number of university professors as honorary members, so as to give the whole matter a nicer appearance. This was in the Hotel Vierjahreszeiten.

Q In the last analysis, now, I would like to get a few reactions with regard to your first impressions about Japan. I realize that when we come to that, that you were one of the most informed and one who wrote most widely upon Japan and the Far East, and that, in all probability, is your strongest point, your strongest point of knowledge. From reading your book, such as "The Japanese Empire," "The Japanese People," and all the others which I have gone through carefully, and

"The Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean," from all of these, and I may add, from your own memoirs, your own writings, I come to the conclusions that you had a great admiration for the Japanese people.

A I may mention here that I have been fortunate enough during my stay in Japan only to come in contact with the best part of the population, and only very little with the tradesmen and the population in the port towns.

Q Well, those with whom you did come in contact were the ones, I take it, who were molding Japanese policy?

A The whole Japanese policy has been directed from four opposite powers; there was the Army, there was the Fleet, there was the Court, and the priesthood, and there was the aristocracy. The policy resulted from all these four opposite different powers.

Q I understand, but when it did result, when the policy did finally take form, did you not approve and feel that it was the correct policy when they absorbed Korea and also began penetration into Manchuria?

A At that time the fleet was under Sacuma, and the whole southern population was very unhappy that the policy of the army has been directed to the continent.

Q I understand that, and that would be an analysis of the diverse forces which finally brought about an Ostland policy. Therefore, let us not discuss the divisions between the countries. I merely want to point out that when the final policy did take place, independently of how it came, you were for it. You approved it.

A I always thought that in some way the huge population pressure of Japan had to be relieved.

Q When you say "the population pressure of Japan had to be relieved", you published an analysis of the Japanese population and you admitted that it was not nearly so high, the pressure, as in many parts of Europe, and you said that there



were still many uncultivated parts north in Hokkaido and in other places. Therefore, the population pressure cannot be used as a reason for your ultimate consent <sup>to</sup> all Japanese policy.

A There you have to say that this was a question of taste and preference. Yes, I have to admit to what the professor has said, but I have to say here that this was largely a matter of preference. In the territories, in the more congenital territories, where there was rice available, the population tended to gather together, and huge pressure of population resulted. However, in the higher northern parts, where rice was not so much available, there was only a very scattered population.

✓ Q You know the distribution of the population, because no one analyzed it more closely than you did. But your final conclusion was that the claim for more Lebensraum, inasmuch as it was based on population pressure, was dubious.

A The same thing appears with us in middle Europe. In Saxony, Thuringia, and so on, you find that the population gathers and is very thick, while in other territories where life would be harder for them and where they would have to work harder, you will find that this is not the case.

Q Very good. That would be an interesting comparative geographical study, but today I am interested only in the ultimate conclusions insofar as they might have influenced the final way which the Japanese government took.

A There one has to say that the Army was victorious on the basis of support of the lower farmer class, that they were victorious over the opinions of the fleet, of the court, and the higher circles.

Q Again I must insist that we are only concerned with the final political decisions and the results which followed of the Japanese government, independently of the ~~divisions~~ <sup>divisions</sup> within the country, and that their final political and military operation was one of forceful annexation of Korea, which you saw when you were

there in 1909, and later a gradual going into Manchuria, and when you observed that you wrote these words in Das Japanische Reich, "This is the school through which Japan went and through which Germany must go."

A We should have learned from this experience that it was our task to populate those districts that we have with farmers and agriculture, which actually has not happened.

Q But what the Japanese did was to populate the lands of other peoples with their own peasants and to annex other lands forcibly, which was their later policy in the Greater East Asia coprosperity zone. Consequently, it seems to me that you gave an approval to a policy of aggression not withstanding the rights of other independent countries.

A Yes. There I differ in my old age with the professor whom I still count as being one of the younger generation. I have seen Korea as it was at that time in 1909 and 1910. Korea always at that time was independent, and the only question was who was going to invade it. Was it to be Russia, or was it to be China, or was it to be Japan?

Q But I must say at that point that a hypothetical supposition as to what might, could, or would happen is no justification for a positive act of aggression.

A The Russian attack has preceded it already. At Yalu it had already been effected.

Q Yes, but that was not Korea.

A The Yalu Mountains, of course, were at the East coast of Korea, and they had been attacked by the Russians.

Q The details at the moment are, I think, not too relevant to our discussion. What I have in mind is that there seems to be in your writings an approval of the idea of the ~~Grossgemeinschaften~~, even despite all international lines.

*/grossraumwirtschaft*

A I have written this book at the time of the Ruhr invasion. This was in 1923, at the time when we were not independent ourselves, and at that time there was no right on our own territory.

Q Your advocacy, however, of that kind of operation ante-dated, went before, the incidents you speak of, because you published "The Geopolitics of the Pacific Ocean" in 1924, and in that volume you said that you hoped, "Japan would become a punishing justice to be felt by our merciless economic and political enemies and oppressors." That was shown already in 1924.

A (Pause.)

Q That means even in '24 you conceived Japan to be the force, you conceived Japan to be a nemesis, for expelling the white man from Asia, and you called it in those years, and later in the Zeitschrift in 1938, "As a symbiosis of social policies."

A At that time, some of our people, some of the best people that have lived in these chief Asiatic colonies, returned under bad conditions from prison ships.

Q I again must emphasize that I do not dispute or go into the motives. What history records is that you approved and that you hoped that Japan would become an element, with Germany, symbiosis, of cultural policy, and that is exactly what happened in the Axis agreement.

A Yes, but in a wrong manner.

Q I understand you, therefore, to explain that you considered Japan and the East Asiatic section as one of the manometers?

A Yes. I want to say at this point that the circle that propagated the East Asiatic relationships was very unhappy about the breakout of the Chinese-

Japanese war in 1937. At that time my son was in Peiking in China, and he was just as unhappy about the situation as I was, which he told me about in detail.

Q In the ~~prospective~~ <sup>perspectives</sup> of history and before the judgment of the world, the most unfortunate point is that the arguments which you gave from a high authority contributed to the final conclusions which unloosed on the United States the bombing of Pearl Harbor and again this terrible tragedy which brought all the millions of Americans to Europe and to Japan. That is the point which I am in all sincerity and frankness trying to establish, whether you agreed to that.

A You will find in many places of my "Geopolitics of the Pacific" where I said that I am very happy about the fact that this territory is not yet the place of war, and where I said that I hoped that its geopolitical nature will protect it from ever being the scene of war.

Q In that your hopes were well-grounded or at least your reasoning was well-grounded; the United States would never have attacked Japan. I know of no reason why America would ever have attacked Japan. It was Japan who attacked us in one of the most treacherous, inhuman ~~events~~ <sup>examples</sup> of treachery yet recorded in history, that while their two Ambassadors were discussing with our Secretary of State, in ~~that~~ very same moment their airplanes were massacring a fleet lying peacefully at anchor. Also I cannot escape the conclusion that the seeds of thought which a person might have planted grew, and although it may be a severe judgement, you must consider whether or not your arguments might not have had some influence in that.

A I don't believe even if I judge myself very severely that I ever had any such intentions.

Q No. No intentions. Your praise <sup>was</sup> of the Japanese people and your praise <sup>was</sup> of their methods of penetration, which you compared to Jiu Jitsu.

A Judo did not attack, but would wait for the attack and was meant to go into action after the attack.

Q But you have said in your explanation of their geopolitics at that time that it was based on the Japanese instinct to go back in order to take the opponent off his balance.

A But only if the opponent comes.

Q That I agree.

A Japan's attempt on Honolulu is against its own ideas of Judo.

Q That may be.

A In order to illustrate to you how difficult it is to avoid unfortunate developments I can tell you about my appointment with the Agricultural Ambassador Count Mushakoji. This man <sup>was</sup> ~~is~~ against every warlike development. He was of the point of view of the old Ito, who thought that an attack against Russia is to be avoided at all costs, either from the side of Germany or from the side of Japan, but when Count Mushakoji was released and was substituted by Baron Oshima, who was neither a diplomat nor a statesman, he said to me that he had the biggest worry regarding our future developments. This is what he said to me, "You have accomplished wonderful technical things in armament and in roads and so on, but you have lost just as we have lost, too, the highest ethical respect for honor, Ehrfurcht." He added that, "You have no more veneration for old age. You have no more respect for religion. You have no more high respect for ethics. And this has happened to us, too, and this is why I have the greatest worries in this respect."

Q I can understand the point of view which you are developing, because in latter years in Japan, some of their most conservative and foresighted statesmen were assassinated, were killed, one after the other. One of them, who was the

Premier, if I am not mistaken . . .

A I knew him personally, yes.

Q . . . was killed after a banquet was given by our American ambassador, who seated him at dinner, and the next day saw his dead body. Therefore, I understand the inner division among the Japanese forces and the rise of a very radical and brutal and aggressive power. I agree that the powers which came into control did not represent the type of respect for human dignity of which your friends spoke. Just as in the case of the German state we have a Minister of Justice, the Nazi Minister of Justice, who said at the congress of German jurists, Leipzig, October 2-4, 1935: "Justice is whatever benefits the German people and injustice whatever harms them."

A This is just in opposition to what Count Mushakoji told me. I remember that my son told me when he returned from his world trip, he said about Japan, "You can be glad that you did not go there again, because if you went to Japan again you would not recognize it any more." I am very sad not to have been able to speak to my son before he was shot by the Gestapo. This time would have been just the right moment for me to speak to him.

Q I understand very deeply, and I appreciate that the course of events may have taken a direction which you never intended. What is, however, historically before the world is that many of your arguments were used both by the Japanese and by the Nazi Party, and I add, according to your testimony yesterday and today, into a direction which you never intended.

A I thank you for appreciating this point.

Q I believe that you are in a position now, with your vast knowledge of so many of the details, to do a great service to a long-suffering humanity and in whatever years Divine Providence may leave to you, to correct for the coming

.generations many of the false conclusions that people came to from reading your almost life work.

A What I am going to tell you now is very intimate. In my farm at Hof Schimmelhof there is a book called "Freedom and Self-Determination in the Historical Life of the People." This is the saddest book that I have ever written, and I was quite sure that it never could have been published from 1941 up to now.

Q I ask you at that point, why not?

A If I had published it up to the beginning of May, I would have been hanged or shot immediately.

Q The government of the United States is now sovereign over this part of Germany.

A Now I am not a prisoner, but for some time I have been a prisoner of the United States in Freising and Oberursel.

Q The ultimate authority on the American side for determining the extent and the punishment of criminals of war at present is lodged in the commission which is located at Nurnberg. Therefore, I make to you a recommendation: If we bring Rudolf Hess into your presence, the two of you who know so much of these movements, would you be inclined to discuss with him why these things took place and what went wrong in the line where you and he were so closely associated?

A I am prepared, if the Professor requests it, I am then prepared to see him even in the critical state of mind as he is now, and I am prepared, in order to use a hard German expression, to go in front of the Devil's eye and talk to him. I would far prefer it if it was in your presence and not in anybody else's presence.

Q That can be done.

A If the Professor is really interested in these things and devotes so much time to them, I want to point out to him that in my farm there is a book that my

dead son has written. Only two copies have been saved. It was called "Procedure of Political Geography and Geopolitics." There are only two copies of this book that have been saved, and 5,000 have been burned. The first copy is completely finished. This would have shown to the Professor and to American scientists now much better than I ever would be able to do it. He would have completed my life work.

Q Now, historical opportunity <sup>d</sup> revolves on your shoulders. Can you remember the main trends of what he did say in that work?

A All these main outlines were based on his relation to American and English scientists. The reason he was shot by the Gestapo was that they feared that he would be able to get in touch with them and he was the one that they would only want to get in touch with in order to put Germany on its feet again.

Q I must remark at that point that your answer still doesn't give me an idea of what the contents and the philosophy, geopolitical philosophy, of that book are.

A I have to say that this book is far more on the line of Professor Walsh and Professor Bowman, President of Johns Hopkins, than on my old line.

Q But is it on your present line?

A It represented my present way of thought far better than I ever would be able to describe it now.

Q I see a great historical opportunity.

A If my powers are sufficient.

Q When a great task <sup>d</sup> evolves on a man, I am of the firm spiritual belief that the power will be given.

A I have here in my hand the last description of what I and my son have gone through in the last year. This is the last copy I have. I don't know if you have that.

Q (Examining document.) This I have already read. Therefore, knowing the events of those years, -I do not make my proposal mandatory, -but I ask you whether or not you would feel that you could do it.

A I can only say I will try. I am ready to try. I cannot say, if the powers are ~~given~~ <sup>left in</sup> to me.

APPROVED: Edmund T. Walsh,  
Consultant on Geopolitics

(Interrogator)

Siegfried Raule

(Interpreter)

William A. Weigel

(Reporter)

